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COMMENT
CONFUSION IN THE COURT: SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW,
EMPLOYER LIABILITY, AND STATUTORY PURPOSE
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment law has come a long way in the twenty
years since the term "sexual harassment" first entered the lexicon. 1
The behavior once regarded as a normal if sometimes offensive
part of human interaction is now, depending on the circumstances,
redressable as illegal discrimination based on gender.2
In particular, more and more U.S. courts are holding employ-
ers liable for harassment in the workplace, especially when perpe-
trated by a supervisor. Indeed, one commentator recently re-
marked, "Considering how costly the federal government has
made the practice, it's amazing that employers still hire women." 3
Strong language, to be sure; one shudders to think how this
commentator might have responded to any number of other deci-
sions that have attempted to dismantle, with varying degrees of
success, other discriminatory practices. Nonetheless, the questions
arise: Has U.S. law gone too far in imposing employer liability for
1. Professor Catharine MacKinnon is generally credited with coining the term "sex-
ual harassment" and with pioneering much of the early thinking in this area. See, e.g.,
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
2. Sexual harassment claims are generally brought under the aegis of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1994) (hereinafter Title VII or Civil Rights
Act), as a form of gender-based discrimination. Guidelines promulgated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have further defined sexual harassment
as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature," under any of three sets of circumstances, including when:
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment,. . . or (3) such conduct has the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work perform-
ance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998).
3. Robyn Blumner, Women Might Price Themselves Out of Jobs, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, at 1D.
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supervisory harassment? What factors should govern such an as-
sessment? Public policy? Fairness? (And if so, to whom?) And
what can we learn from the corresponding law of other countries,
in particular the United Kingdom, with its familiar mix of legisla-
tive statute and judge-made law?
Interestingly, recent Supreme Court decisions in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth4 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton5
have brought U.S. and U.K. sexual harassment law into closer
alignment, especially with regard to employer liability. Intriguing
differences remain, however, promising mutual benefit from a
careful comparison of the two bodies of law.
Part II below outlines the current state of sexual harassment
law, beginning with a description of the development of sexual
harassment as a legal concept, and then moving to the develop-
ment of the two bodies of law this Comment proposes to compare:
that of the United States and of the United Kingdom. Because
both are common law countries, 6 this Comment relies heavily on
the case law of each, although the developing law of the European
Union 7 will figure in as well, sometimes in surprising ways.
Part III presents a comparison and analysis of U.S. and U.K.
sexual harassment law, focusing on the underlying theories for
employer liability. In particular, this section looks at how U.K.
law, while initially following U.S. law, now appears to be leading
the way.
Finally, Part IV begins by noting that U.S. and U.K. sexual
harassment law have paralleled each other throughout their devel-
opment and are now converging on essentially the same policy-
based approach to employer liability for harassment by a supervi-
4. 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998).
5. 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998).
6. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 30-
31(1998).
7. For example, a threshold question in a 1998 case considered whether certain
statutory protections against sex discrimination applied to individuals who had undergone
gender reassignment. The English court looked to the European Union's Equal Treat-
ment Directive. of 1976 as well as to rulings by the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights. See Chiessington World of Adventures Ltd. v. Reed
[1998] I.C.R. 97 (Eng.). See also Victoria A. Carter, Working on Dignity: EC Initiatives
on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 12 Nw. J. INTL. L. BUS. 431, 439-42 (1992), for a
succinct, fascinating discussion of the various directives, resolutions and other legislation
adopted by the European Union in its effort to combat sex discrimination and sexual har-
assment in the workplace.
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sor. Both bodies of law regard sexual harassment in the workplace
as an illegal form of gender-based discrimination with repercus-
sions that are systemic. In response, both systems have moved to-
ward a fairly strict form of liability, but one that gives the em-
ployer credit for taking reasonable steps to prevent and correct
harassment.
Significantly, however, British case law has embraced legisla-
tive purpose almost exclusively in justifying its approach, while
U.S. case law has attempted to reconcile legislative purpose with
principles of agency. 8 As a result, U.S. law tends to be more con-
fused and convoluted, with efforts to define brightline tests based
on agency only adding to the confusion. Thus, this Comment rec-
ommends that Americans take a cue from the British and consider
premising employer liability for sexual harassment on the under-
lying policy and intent of the Civil Rights Act, and not on nine-
teenth century tort law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Sexual Harassment as a Legal Claim
Sexual harassment, the experience, is as old as human his-
tory.9 Sexual harassment, the legal complaint, began doctrinally in
1979 with Catharine MacKinnon's provocative and still compelling
work, Sexual Harassment of Working Women. 10 According to
MacKinnon, "Sexual harassment, most broadly defined, refers to
the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power."11  In addition, MacKinnon ad-
vanced the argument that sexual harassment was a form of sex dis-
crimination 12 and, as such, was illegal under Title VII of the Civil
8. Agency law is a set of principles that define the circumstances under which the
wrongs of a servant (or employee) may be imputed to his master (or employer) for pur-
poses of vicarious liability. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 69-70 (5th ed. 1984).
9. See, e.g., Tanya Martinez Shively, Sexual Harassment in the European Union:
King Rex Meets Potiphar's Wife, 55 LA. L. REV. 1087, 1088-89 (1995) (recounting the sex-
ual harassment of Joseph by King Potiphar's wife, as told in the Old Testament of the Bi-
ble).
10. MAcKINNON, supra note 1.
11. Id. at 1.
12. See id. at 4; see also id. at 143-49, 174-213 (presenting the heart of MacKinnon's
argument that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, whether such discrimina-
1999]
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Rights Act of 1964.13
Under this theory, sexual harassment as an actionable form of
illegal sex discrimination entered U.S. Supreme Court case law
14
with the 1986 case, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.15 Former
bank employee Mechele Vinson complained that her supervisor,
Sidney Taylor, made repeated demands on her "for sexual favors,
usually at the branch, both during and after business hours.... In
addition, [she] testified that Taylor fondled her in front of other
employees, followed her into the women's restroom when she
went there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped
her on several occasions."
16
The Meritor Court observed that the conditions of the com-
plainant's employment were affected by the demands made by her
supervisor, and to which she submitted out of fear of losing her
job. Relying on principles of agency, 17 the Court unanimously
found the bank liable for "hostile environment" sexual harass-
ment.18 Rejecting the bank's view that illegal discrimination re-
quired the victim suffer some tangible job detriment, the Court
noted, "[T]he language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or
'tangible' discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at
tion is premised on a perceived "inequality" between the sexes or on one or more arbi-
trary "differences").
13. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1994). Title VII reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or ref-
use to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ....
Id. 2000e-2.
14. Earlier cases treated sexual harassment as a "personal proclivity" of the harasser
and not as conduct that affected the victim's employment, with the result that plaintiff's
claim was rejected. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D.
Ariz. 1975).
15. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
16. Id. at 60.
17. The Court cited the EEOC's contention that courts should draw from "traditional
agency principles" in formulating the rules for employer liability. Id. at 70.
18. See id. at 59-60, 64-67 (citation omitted). In characterizing the discrimination suf-
fered by Vinson as "hostile environment" sexual harassment, the Court relied on MacK-
innon's distinction between "quid pro quo" harassment (an explicit or implicit require-
ment that the woman comply with a sexual demand or else suffer job-related detriment)
and "hostile environment" harassment (unwanted sexual conduct so severe and pervasive
that the work environment is made unbearable), See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 32,40.
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the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in
employment."' 19
Since Meritor, the courts have witnessed an ever-increasing
upsurge in the number of sexual harassment claims.20 A 1991 bill
allowing employees to sue for compensatory damages, and not
simply back wages or injunctive relief, further increased the num-
ber of claims that reached the courts.21 Even so, the circumstances
under which an employer could be held accountable for harass-
ment by a supervisor showed little sign of settling down. One rea-
son may stem from early resistance by the courts to recognizing a
claim whose very name had only recently entered the lexicon,
22
but surely another reason is that sexual harassment, as a social
wrong and as a legal claim, has never fit neatly into the category of
sex discrimination.
23
In any case, a number of issues remain tantalizingly open,
raising questions that have provoked whole new sets of issues and
questions. For example, regarding the definition of sexual harass-
ment: Is the requirement that the harassing conduct be "un-
wanted" simply a way of shifting focus to the victim and suggesting
19. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
20. "According to a recent study, nearly 75% of medium and large firms reported
sexual harassment claims in 1996-compared to a tally of just over 50% five years earlier."
WILLIAM PETROCELLI & BARBARA KATE REPA, SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON THE JOB:
WHAT IT IS & HOW TO STOP IT 3/35 (1998). See also Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Worker
Bias Cases Are Rising Steadily: New Laws Boost Hopes for Monetary Awards, WASH.
POST, May 12, 1997, at Al.
21. See id at 1/23. Passed following the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings, this
compromise version of a previously vetoed bill capped the total damages employees could
recover at between $50,000 and $300,000, depending on the size of the company. See id.
See also Grimsley, supra note 20.
22. MacKinnon notes, "Until 1976, lacking a term to express it, sexual harassment
was literally unspeakable, which made a generalized, shared, and social definition of it in-
accessible" (footnote omitted). MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 27.
23. For example, the first and third elements of the discrimination claim require that
the victim be a member of a protected class and that the harassing behavior have been
based on that membership, respectively. Initially, meeting these elements required some
logical and semantic juggling, including the argument that, but for her sex, the claimant
would not have been the victim of the alleged conduct. This led to the odd result that,
while heterosexuals and homosexuals could harass in a way that qualified as illegal sex dis-
crimination, bisexual harassers could not. See, e.g., Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Em-
ployer Liability Under Title Vlfor Sexual Harassment after Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1259 n.13 (1987) (noting the "apparent consensus that
bisexual harassment is not covered by Title VII because such harassment is not 'based on
sex').
1999]
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that she "asked for it"? 24 Or does it acknowledge the sexual
autonomy of women and their ability to make their own sexual
choices? 25 What about use of the "reasonableness test" to deter-
mine whether hostile environment harassment was sufficiently se-
vere and pervasive to interfere with the terms and conditions of a
victim's employment: Is this fair, or does such a test, by being tied
to a notion of societal consensus, merely perpetuate the status
quo?26 Moreover, must sexual harassment even be sexual in na-
ture? 27 Or would gender-based hostility toward women (or men)
also qualify as sexual harassment? 28 Finally, given a consensus that
sexual harassment exists and can be defined as a legal harm, who
should bear the cost of harassment in the workplace: the victim?
the harasser? the employer? If the employer, what is the underly-
ing theory of liability? 29 And what should be the remedy?
30
Equally interesting, perhaps, are the ways in which the legal
24. See, e.g., Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It?: The "Unwelcome" Require-
ment in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558 (1992).
25. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683
(1998). See also Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 691, 746-47 (1997) ("The requirement that the plaintiff prove the sexual conduct
was unwelcome clearly presupposes a degree of female agency in these contexts.")
26. See, e.g., Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology
of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.i. 1177, 1178 (1990) ("Why, for
example, in the context of anti-discrimination statutes designed to reform society, is a
standard that is explicitly tied to the status quo thought to be a proper vehicle for identi-
fying discriminatory behavior?") (footnote omitted).
27. See Schultz, supra note 25, at 1689 (arguing that the focus of sexual harassment
law "should not be on sexuality as such. The focus should be on conduct that consigns
people to gendered work roles that do not further their own aspirations or advantage").
28. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Trouble with Sex, NEW YORKER, Feb. 8, 1998, at 48.
Toobin describes Professor Vicki Schultz as having "demolish[ed] the claim that there is
no harassment without sex. Such a view, she writes, seriously understates the amount of
real sexual discrimination in the workplace." Id. at 55. But see, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at
Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 820 (1991). Estrich writes: "[Harassment] cases are such a
disaster in doctrinal terms precisely because, as with rape, they involve sex and sexuality."
Id.
29. See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title
VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 66 (1995); Ronald Turner, Title VII and Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment: Mislabeling the Standard of Employer Liability, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
817 (1994).
30. See, e.g., Marlisa Vinciguerra, Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Stan-
dards in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 (1989) ("Plaintiffs prov-
ing hostile environment harassment are confined to injunctive relief and reinstatement
because the hostile environment claim specifically seeks to redress non-economic inju-
ries.") (footnote omitted).
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definition of sexual harassment, the basis for liability, and the al-
lowed remedy have interacted over time. For example, it seems
plausible that confusion over exactly what constituted sexual har-
assment 31 was a factor in the courts' early resistance to finding
employers liable-and perhaps even in the reluctance on the part
of the political branches to provide for compensatory damages
once an employer was found liable. 32 Thus, the 1998 Supreme
Court decisions regarding employer liability for workplace har-
assment, particularly in Burlington Industries and Faragher, bring a
curious hope: that as the definition of sexual harassment settles,
the basis for finding employer liability will be clarified as well, and
further, that the relief granted will be brought into line with the
injury done.
B. Sexual Harassment Law in the United States
1. The Early Cases
U.S. courts initially refused to recognize sexual harassment as
a legal claim under Title VII, in part because the statute itself,
while covering discrimination based on gender, said nothing about
sexual harassment. 33 Indeed, the early courts typically found that
the conduct on which a victim based her sexual harassment claim
might well be offensive but that it constituted a "personal procliv-
ity" 34 of the offender or even "social patterns that to some extent
are normal and expectable." 35 Courts worried that the difficulty of
distinguishing among "invited, uninvited-but-welcome, offensive-
but-tolerated and flatly rejected advances," placed an unfair bur-
31. See, e.g., Richard Cohen, What's Harassment? Ask the Woman, WASH. POST, July
5,1988, at A19.
32. See Vinciguerra, supra note 30, and accompanying text. But see also supra note
21 and accompanying text, for recent changes in the law regarding compensatory damages
for sexual harassment claims.
33. Moreover, as has been noted by numerous authors on the subject, gender-based
discrimination by employers was added late to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in an attempt
by the bill's opponents to derail its passage; thus, there is little legislative history to guide
the courts in their consideration of sexual harassment claims. See, e.g., Turner, supra note
29 at 818; Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Princi-
ples: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229,
1231 (1991).
34. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161,163 (D. Ariz. 1975).
35. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
1999]
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den on employers.36 At least one commentator expressed the view
that "relations between the sexes may be chilled if men fear that
behavior offensive to a sensitive woman may be actionable in
court.,,
37
After the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) published its guidelines on sexual harassment (EEOC
Guidelines) 38 in 1980, U.S. courts began to recognize sexual har-
assment as grounds for a claim of sex discrimination.39 Coverage
extended to both quid pro quo harassment, in which an employer
or supervisor attempts to extort sexual favors from another em-
ployee in exchange for some promised work-related benefit, and
hostile environment harassment, in which more general conduct of
a sexual nature serves to create a hostile or offensive work envi-
ronment for other employees.
40
In 1982, the court in Henson v. City of Dundee41 used agency
principles in conjunction with the EEOC guidelines to define a
two-tiered approach to employer liability for sexual harassment by
a supervisor. 42 In the case of quid pro quo harassment, the Court
said, where the supervisor "relies upon his apparent or actual
authority to extort sexual consideration from an employee," 43 the
harassing conduct is considered within the supervisor's scope of
employment and as such may be imputed to the employer.44 The
36. Id. at 999 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
37. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1458 (1984).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998).
39. See Nicolle R. Lipper, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Comparative Study
of Great Britain and the United States, 13 COMP. LAB. L. 293,307 (1992).
40. See supra note 2 for relevant EEOC Guideline provisions; see also supra note 18
for Catharine MacKinnon's distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment
harassment.
41. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
42. The Henson Court relied on the EEOC Guidelines' distinction between quid pro
quo and hostile environment harassment described in supra note 2.
43. Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
44. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 8, § 70 at 502. The authors describe "in the scope of
employment" as a
highly indefinite phrase, which sometimes is varied with 'in the course of...
employment,' [and which] is so devoid of meaning in itself that its very
vagueness has been of value in permitting a desirable degree of flexibility in
decisions.... It refers to those acts which are so closely connected with what
the servant is employed to do... that they may be regarded as methods, even
though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employ-
[Vol. 21:521
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employer is then held strictly liable for the supervisor's conduct
under the agency doctrine of respondeat superior.
45
Hostile environment harassment, on the other hand, because
it is done for the supervisor's own reasons (according to the Hen-
son Court), occurs "outside the actual or apparent scope of the
authority he possesses as a supervisor." 46 Thus, employer liability
for environmental harassment could be neither strict nor auto-
matic but should depend on whether the employer had actual or
constructive knowledge of the harassing conduct.
47
In short, the Henson Court approach to employer liability for
supervisory harassment turned on whether the supervisor acted
within the scope of the authority delegated to him and, if he did
not, whether the employer had knowledge of the conduct. Inter-
estingly enough, for all the confusion expressed over what consti-
tutes sexual harassment and who should pay for it, this bifurcated
approach to employer liability survives to this day, albeit in some-
what modified form.
Thus, as just noted, findings of quid pro quo harassment tend
to turn on whether the harassing supervisor acted within the scope
of his authority, while findings of hostile environment harassment
tend to turn on whether the employer had knowledge of the har-
assing conduct. This distinction informed many of the decisions
that followed Henson, including most notably Meritor. Moreover,
although the Burlington Industries and Faragher Courts rejected
premising the standard of employer liability on a distinction be-
tween quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment, they
drew a similar line with regard to whether the harassment resulted
in "tangible employment action."4
8
ment.
Id.
45. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 8, § 69 at 499. The authors note that the principle by
which the negligence of a wrong-doer may be imputed to another person for purposes of
liability is generally called either vicarious liability or, using its Latin name, respondeat su-
perior. Id.
46. Henson, 682 F.2d at 910.
47. See id.
48. In general, harassment resulting in "tangible employment action" tends to line up
with quid pro quo harassment, while harassment without such a tangible result tends to
fall into the hostile environment category. See also infra note 139 and accompanying text.
1999]
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2. Meritor and Its Progeny
As noted in the previous section, the landmark Supreme
Court decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson49 heralded the
true beginning 50 of employer liability under Title VII for sex-based
harassment in the workplace. In Meritor, the Supreme Court
unanimously found that sexual harassment that created a "hostile
or offensive environment ' 51 was actionable under Title VII, even
without tangible job detriment and even if the victim voluntarily
complied with the harasser's demands. 52 The correct inquiry, said
the Court, was not whether the victim's conduct was "voluntary"
but whether the victim indicated that the harasser's advances were
unwelcome. 53
On the issue of employer liability, however, the Meritor Court
offered a more mixed holding. Quoting the Henson decision with
apparent approval,54 it nonetheless rejected both absolute liability
for supervisory harassment and a requirement of actual knowl-
edge.55 According to the Court, Title VII's use of agency terms in
its definition of employer 56 indicated congressional intent to limit
the scope of employer liability for acts by its employees. 57 As a re-
sult, Justice Rehnquist declined to rule definitively on employer
liability and referred the lower courts to agency principles for
guidance.58 Nevertheless, the Court found the Meritor Savings
Bank liable, noting that even the victim's "failure to use [the
bank's] established grievance procedure, or to otherwise put it on
49. 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also text accompanying supra notes 14-15.
50. An earlier case, Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), also acknowl-
edged the merits of using Title VII as a basis for sexual harassment claims, but emphasized
the retaliatory nature of the supervisor's conduct in its finding of harassment. See Lipper,
supra note 39, at 305.
51. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
52. See id. at 64, 68-69.
53. See id. at 68.
54. See Phillips, supra note 33, at 1240, n.69.
55. Sharon T. Bradford, Relief for Hostile Work Environment Discrimination: Re-
storing Title VII's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 1611, 1614, n.28 (1990). Note, however,
that by not distinguishing between quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment, the
Meritor Court may not be in direct conflict with the Henson decision.
56. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (1994).
57. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
58. See id. The EEOC, in an amicus curiae cited in the Meritor decision, "con-
tend[ed] that courts formulating employer liability rules should draw from traditional
agency principles." Id. at 70.
[Vol. 21:521
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notice of the alleged misconduct," did not insulate the bank from
liability for the harasser's wrongdoing.59
In the decade following Meritor, several intertwined themes
began to emerge in the treatment of sexual harassment claims.
Employer liability continued to be premised on agency principles,
most often the strict liability doctrine of respondeat superior.60 At
the same time, courts often mitigated the harshness of respondeat
superior by requiring actual or constructive knowledge on the part
of the employer, at least in the case of hostile environment har-
assment. 61 Indeed, the Sims Court rejected strict liability outright
and declared that "whether making out a claim for hostile work
environment or quid pro quo type sexual harassment, a plaintiff
must prove that the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment in question.... "62
Furthermore, although the Meritor Court concluded that "the
mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against dis-
crimination" did not automatically insulate an employer against
liability,63 many courts have looked favorably on the existence of
59. Id.
60. Shortly after Meritor, the Rabidue Court echoed the Henson Court in declaring
the existence of respondeat superior liability an element of the hostile environment har-
assment claim. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. 805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986).
The following year, the Yates Court used scope-of-employment to require examination of
such factors as when and where the harassing conduct took place and whether it was fore-
seeable. See Yates v. Avco, 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987). Similarly, in 1992, the
Kauffman Court relied on agency principles to determine the scope of a supervisor's
authority, as well as the foreseeability of his harassing conduct. See Kauffman v. Allied
Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 184 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1041 (1992).
61. Although the Karibian Court, echoing Meritor, opined that lack of notice did not
always insulate employers from liability, see Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2693 (1994), the Silverstein Court held for the employer
because the victim failed to report the harassment, in spite of having the opportunity to do
so, and because the harassment "was not so pervasive as to put [her employer] on con-
structive notice of the conduct," Silverstein v. Metroplex Communications, Inc. 678 F.
Supp. 863, 870 (1988).
62. Sims v. Brown & Root Indus. Servs., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 920, 925 (1995). In gen-
eral, however, proof of employer knowledge was not required for claims of quid pro quo
harassment -nor, in some courts, for claims of hostile environment harassment by a su-
pervisor. Indeed, a 1994 guide to filing sexual harassment claims advised, "Where sexual
harassment has quid pro quo as well as hostile environment characteristics, it may be
beneficial to allege quid pro quo harassment, since employers will be held strictly liable for
a supervisor's conduct only under this type of claim" (footnote omitted). ANJA
ANGELICA CHAN, WOMEN AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE
LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF TITLE VII AND THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIM 17 (1994).
63. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
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such procedures and policies. 64 The Sims Court, for example, in a
case of quid pro quo harassment by a supervisor, held for the em-
ployer after it took prompt remedial action in response to the vic-
tim's complaint.
65
Even so, courts continued to express confusion as to what
should be the appropriate standard of employer liability for har-
assment by a supervisor. In 1995, the Seventh Circuit attempted to
bring some clarity to sexual harassment law by hearing two cases
en banc.66 The result was "eight separate opinions, each differing
on exactly what liability standard to apply... "67 Not surprisingly,
the panel urged the Supreme Court to "bring order to the chaotic
case law in this important field of practice." 68
3. Burlington Industries69 and Faragher7°
The Court attempted to do just that in the summer of 1998,
handing down decisions in two cases that dealt with the specific
circumstances in which an employer could be held liable for har-
assment by a supervisor.
In Burlington Industries, the Court considered the case of re-
spondent Kimberly Ellerth, who had been subjected to "constant
sexual harassment" by her supervisor, a mid-level manager at
Burlington Industries.71 After fifteen months, Ellerth left her job
and filed a claim against her employer under Title VII. 72 The Dis-
trict Court granted summary judgment for the employer, finding
that Ellerth had suffered no "tangible job detriment" and had left
her job without making use of the company's grievance procedures
or informing anyone in authority of her supervisor's conduct.73
The Court of Appeals then reversed en banc, "produc[ing] eight
64. See Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 184 (looking to the efficacy of the employer's response
to a complaint of hostile environment sexual harassment by a supervisor).
65. "Brown & Root acted as a responsible, exemplary employer by processing Sims'
complaint swiftly, seriously, and, upon gathering the evidence in a thorough manner, deci-
sively and justly." Sims, 889 F. Supp. at 931.
66. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
67. Stacey Dansky, Note, Eliminating Strict Employer Liability in Quid Pro Quo Sex-
ual Harassment Cases, 76 TEX. L. REV. 435,443 n.31 (1997).
68. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 494-95.
69. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998).
70. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998).
71. See Burlington Industries, 118 S.Ct. at 2262.
72. See id. at 2263.
73. See id. at 2262-63.
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separate opinions and no consensus for a controlling rationale. '" 74
In Faragher, meanwhile, the Court considered the case of pe-
titioner Beth Ann Faragher, who had been subjected to ongoing
hostile environment harassment from two of her immediate super-
visors while working as a part-time and summer lifeguard over a
period of five years.75 Although Faragher and several other fe-
male lifeguards complained informally to one supervisor about the
harassment, the remoteness of the lifeguard station from their em-
ployer made formal complaint difficult.76 The District Court
found for Faragher and her co-workers on her Title VII claim and
awarded nominal damages, which the appellate court later re-
versed.77 The Court of Appeals said that while it agreed with the
lower court that Faragher's supervisors had created an "objec-
tively abusive work environment," their behavior had been outside
the scope of their employment and therefore could not be imputed
to their employer.
78
Thus, in both Burlington Industries and Faragher, the Court
confronted the issue of employer liability. Specifically, the Court
asked the question: Under what standard of liability, and in what
circumstances, can the harassing conduct of a supervisor be im-
puted to the employer? Writing for the Faragher majority, Justice
Souter noted,
Since our decision in Meritor, Courts of Appeals have struggled
to derive manageable standards to govern employer liability for
hostile environment harassment perpetrated by supervisory
employees. While following our admonition to find guidance in
the common law of agency .... the Courts of Appeals have
adopted different approaches .... We granted certiorari to ad-
dress the divergence .... 79
Briefly,80 the Court declared that employers are subject to vi-
carious liability for hostile environment sexual harassment by su-
74. Id. at 2263. The Seventh Circuit consolidated for decision the appeals reargued
the same day on behalf of plaintiffs Jansen and Ellerth. See Jansen, 123 F.3d at 492.
75. See Faragher, 118 S.Ct. at 2280.
76. See id. at 2280-81.
77. See id. at 2281.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2282.
80. The Faragher and Burlington Industries decisions will be discussed in greater de-
tail infra Part III.
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pervisors. 81 Where the harassing conduct results in a tangible job
detriment, that liability may be considered strict. 82 Where there is
no tangible detriment, however, the employer may assert an af-
firmative defense based primarily on its having "exercised reason-
able care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior."83
It remains to be seen, of course, whether this most recent ar-
ticulation of an employer liability standard will bring the desired
clarity to sexual harassment law or only add to the confusion by
defining yet another set of factors (i.e., "tangible employment ac-
tion" and "reasonable care" to prevent the harassment) to be con-
sidered. Justice Thomas, in his dissenting opinion in Burlington
Industries, predicted "a continuing reign of confusion.... "84 Even
so, comparison of U.S. law to that of the United Kingdom gives
reason to hope that clarity, fairness and effective policy will indeed
be the result.
C. Sexual Harassment Law in the United Kingdom
1. Legislation and Early Case Law
The development of sexual harassment law in the United
Kingdom has paralleled that of the United States in a number of
ways. Indeed, one commentator observed in 1991 that Britain's
jurisprudence in the area of sexual harassment was "largely based
on American federal law." 8
5
For example, Britain's Sex Discrimination Act (SDA) 197586
models Title VII closely, declaring unequivocally that gender-
based discrimination in employment is illegal and supporting em-
ployer liability for job-related detriment. 87 Moreover, although
81. See Faragher, 118 S.Ct. at 2292-93.
82. See id. at 2293.
83. Id.
84. Burlington Industries, 118 S.Ct. at 2273 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
85. David Pannick, The Euro Guide on Sexual Harassment, TIMES (London), Oct. 29,
1991.
86. Sex Discrimination Act 1975, ch. 65 (Eng.).
87. See Lipper, supra note 39, at 315. Lipper notes:
Just as Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating in the terms and
conditions of employment on the basis of sex, section 1(1) of the [Sex Dis-
crimination] Act provides that: 'A person discriminates against a woman in
any circumstances relevant for the purposes . . . of [the] Act if: (a) on the
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the SDA does not mention sexual harassment specifically, it has
been used since 1986 as the primary legislative "vehicle for pro-
moting the redress of sexual harassment claims as unlawful sex
discrimination. "88
Decided in the wake of Meritor, Strathclyde Regional Council
v. Porcelli89 recognized quid pro quo harassment as constituting a
job-related detriment within the meaning of the SDA.90 Moreo-
ver, the court rejected the lower tribunal's finding that the specific
conduct complained of in this case was based on "dislike for [the
complainant] as a colleague" 91 rather than on her gender. None-
theless, because the employer accepted responsibility for the har-
asser's conduct, the lower court did not reach the issue of em-
ployer liability and left that open for another day.92
2. Scope of Employment and Reasonable Steps
Just as with U.S. cases, scope of employment as a basis for
employer liability continued to be argued throughout the following
decade. For example, the conduct of a postman who wrote ethnic
slurs on mail addressed to his African-Jamaican neighbors was
found to be outside the course of his employment and thus not im-
putable to his employer. 9
3
In 1997, however, in a case that reached the English Court of
Appeal,94 the court overturned a majority decision below that de-
termined the racially harassing conduct by employees in a shoe
factory to be outside the scope of their employment and thus not
ground of her sex he treats her less favourably then he treats or would treat a
man.'
Id.
88. Id. at 317 (referring to the first sexual harassment case to reach the British appel-
late courts).
89. [1986] I.C.R. 564 (Scot.).
90. See id. at 576; see also Lipper, supra note 39, at 317.
91. Strathclyde Regional Council [1986] I.C.R. at 569.
92. See Porcelli v. Strathclyde Regional Council [1985] I.C.R. 177, 181 (Scot.). Nor
was the issue of employer liability raised on appeal; rather, the employer claimed the har-
assment suffered by the complainant was based on personal dislike rather than gender.
See Strathclyde Regional Council [1986] I.C.R. at 569.
93. See Irving & Irving v. The Post Office [1987] I.R.L.R. 289, 290-91 (Eng.). Note
that British case law typically refers to "course of employment" rather than "scope of em-
ployment." In any case, the terms are generally regarded as interchangeable. See supra
note 44.
94. Jones v. Tower Boot Co. Ltd. [1997] 2 All E.R. 406 (Eng.).
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imputable to their employer.95 The court deemed it error to rely
on the common law concepts of vicarious liability and course of
employment, rather than on the avowed purpose of the statute
authorizing the plaintiff's claim.
96
Even so, the British courts continued to consider such tort
concepts as foreseeability, awareness, and control in their attempts
to determine employer liability. In a 1987 case, for example, the
court declared that the conduct complained of was unforeseeable
and that, as a result, the employer could be not held accountable.
97
In a more recent case, however, the court viewed with disap-
proval the import of negligence principles into "the statutory torts
of racial and sexual discrimination." 98 Focusing on statutory intent
rather than common law, the court reframed the issue as "whether
the event in question was something.., sufficiently under the con-
trol of the employer that he could, by the application of good em-
ployment practice, have prevented the harassment or reduced the
extent of it. If such is the finding, then the employer has subjected
the employee to the harassment." 99
In another 1997 case, the court looked to both control and
awareness of the harassing conduct to find an employer liable for
the harassment of an employee who had undergone gender reas-
95. See id. at 409-10. Jones, a sixteen-year-old boy of racially mixed heritage, gave
evidence that during his month of employment fellow workers burned him with a hot
screwdriver, whipped him on the legs, threw metal bolts at him, tried to force his arm into
a lasting machine, and abused him verbally with ethnic slurs. See id. at 408-09. Note that
Jones was harassed by co-workers rather than by a supervisor. Nonetheless, the court's
finding appears to turn on scope or course of employment rather on the position of the
harassers. Indeed, the court quoted from the governing provision of the Race Relations
Act: "'Anything done by a person in the course of his employment shall be treated for the
purposes of this Act ... as done by his employer as well as by him, whether or not it was
done with the employer's knowledge or approval."' Id. at 408.
96. The court observed:
[An inevitable result of construing 'course of employment' in the [common
law context of vicarious liability] will be that the more heinous the act of dis-
crimination, the less likely it will be that the employer would be liable ....
[This] cuts across the whole legislative scheme and underlying policy of section
32 [of the Race Relations Act 1976].
Id. at 414-15. Moreover, the court declared that the preference for purposive statutory
construction applied to cases brought under the Sex Discrimination Act as well as the
Race Relations Act. See id.
97. See Balgobin & Another v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1987]
I.C.R. 829, 833-34 (Eng.).
98. Burton & Rhule v. De Vere Hotels [1997] I.C.R. 1, 10 (Eng.).
99. Id.
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signment.100 The court declared, "It is abundantly clear... [that]
the appellant was aware of the campaign of harassment directed
towards the respondent, but took no adequate steps to prevent it,
although it was plainly something over which it could exercise con-
trol."101
Finally, in another interesting parallel to U.S. law, the British
courts have considered whether the employer took all reasonable
steps to prevent and correct workplace harassment. Indeed, the
court's attention to whether the employer had control over the
situation or conduct complained of is typically couched in terms of
prevention and correction. In Burton & Rhule, for example, the
court noted that the respondent was a "large organisation operat-
ing about twenty hotels. It [had] a personnel department and a
personnel and training manual covering, inter alia, equal opportu-
nity policy in respect of both race and sex discrimination."
10 2
Moreover, the employer told the tribunal that "he would never
allow young female staff to go into a function where he knew a
performer might tell sexually explicit jokes. ' 10 3 Nonetheless, the
court found that the employer had given insufficient thought to the
events under his control and that his lack of thought "subjected"
the appellants to the racial and sexual harassment they suffered. 10 4
In short, British law has moved steadily toward a standard of
strict employer liability for sexual harassment of an employee,
whether that harassment is perpetrated by a supervisor, a co-
worker or, it seems, a third party. In the absence of tangible job
100. Chessington World of Adventures Ltd. v. Reed [1998] I.C.R. 97 (Eng.). In de-
termining that the SDA applied to individuals who had undergone gender reassignment,
the English court looked not only to its own case law, but to the European Union's Equal
Treatment Directive of 1976, as well as to rulings by the European Court of Justice and
the European Court of Human Rights. See id. at 101-404.
101. Id. at 104-05.
102. Burton & Rhule [1997] I.C.R. at 3.
103. Id. at 10.
104. See id. at 10-11. Note that this is a case of third-party rather than supervisory or
even employee harassment. By rejecting negligence principles and focusing on whether
the employer had control over the situation in which the harassment occurred, the court
avoided the issue of whether the conduct by the harassers was the employer's responsibil-
ity. Thus, the court was able to find direct liability where vicariously liability was, pre-
sumably, not available. Moreover, the Chessington Court's citing of the Burton Court's
"control" test suggests this case may have wider applicability than simply third-party har-
assment. See Chessington [1998] I.C.R. at 105.
1999]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
detriment,105 the harshness of this standard is mitigated to some
extent by an affirmative defense that turns on such negligence-type
principles as whether the employer took "reasonable steps" to
prevent the harassment-although recent decisions suggest there
may be limits to its availability.
III. ANALYSIS: COMPARISON OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
A. The Emerging Standard of Employer Liability
As noted above, the development of sexual harassment law in
the United States and the United Kingdom followed remarkably
similar paths. First, both sets of law began as case law "piggy-
backed" onto anti-discrimination statutes that did not explicitly
mention sexual harassment as a form of gender-based discrimina-
tion. Second, courts in both countries rejected early workplace
harassment claims, finding that the conduct complained of was a
personal proclivity of the harasser and not a form of discrimination
for which an employer could be held liable. Finally, once work-
place harassment was recognized as an actionable claim, courts in
both countries experienced some degree of confusion, even while
hammering out what specifically constituted sexual harassment
and under what circumstances an employer could be held account-
able for harassment in the workplace.
Interestingly, while the United States initially led the way in
the area of anti-discrimination and sexual harassment law, the
United Kingdom quickly caught up.106 Indeed, the case that
moved U.K. law toward a fairly strict form of employer liability for
workplace harassment, Burton & Rhule v. De Vere Hotels,107 pre-
ceded similar rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court by almost two
years. Furthermore, while U.S. courts are still attempting to rec-
105. In the case of tangible job detriment resulting from harassment by a supervisor or
fellow employee, the employer may be held directly liable without recourse to the statu-
tory defense. In the absence of such detriment, the employer may be held vicariously li-
able, subject to the statutory defense. See, e.g., Chessington [1998] I.C.R. at 100-01.
106. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 preceded the United Kingdom's Sex Discrimination
Act by eleven years, while the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, preceded the U.K. case, Strathclyde Regional Council v. Porcelli, by mere
months.
107. [19971 I.C.R. 1 (Eng.).
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oncile sexual harassment law with variously understood agency
principles, U.K. courts appear to have moved away from agency
law and are basing their decisions on legislative intent and under-
lying policy.
In any case, the emerging standard for employer liability in
both countries appears to be fairly strict, at least at first glance.
England's Burton court, for example, applied section 32 of the
Race Relations Act 1976,108 which provides for vicarious liability
of employers for "[a]nything done by [an employee or agent] in
the course of his employment," 10 9 and held the defendant liable
for "harassment .. . in circumstances in which he can control
whether it happens or not." 110 Moreover, lest its point be unclear,
the court took pains to note in obiter dicta, "It is undesirable that
concepts of the law of negligence should be imported into the
statutory torts of racial and sexual discrimination.
'" 111
Nonetheless, the Burton Court did speculate on the amount
of forethought the defendant could have given to the situation in
which young black waitresses in his employ were harassed by un-
ruly dinner guests, and on the actions he could have taken to pre-
vent the harassment.1 2 In so doing, the court seemed to allow for
the possibility of a "reasonable steps" defense. Indeed, in a case
decided the following year, the court premised liability explicitly,
at least in part, on the lack of "adequate steps" taken to prevent
the harassment in question, even though it was a situation over
which the employer had control.
113
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Burlington Industries
and Faragher, held that '"a]n employer is subject to vicarious li-
ability ... for an actionable hostile environment created by a su-
pervisor. . ". ."114 But, where the victimized employee did not suf-
fer tangible employment action, the Court went on to define an
affirmative defense comprised in part of "reasonable care [by the
employer] to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
108. Race Relations Act 1976, ch. 74 (Eng.).
109. Id. pt. IV, § 32(1).
110. Burton & Rhule [19971 I.C.R. at 10.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See Chessington World of Adventures Ltd. v. Reed [1998] I.C.R. 97, 105 (Eng.).
114. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257,2270 (1998).
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Thus, both U.S. and U.K. courts have moved toward a strict
standard of employer liability for supervisory harassment, recog-
nizing to varying degrees the underlying legislative intent of the
governing anti-discrimination statutes to prevent the harm of dis-
crimination in the workplace. 116 At the same time, the courts of
both countries have recognized, again to varying degrees, the im-
portance of considering "reasonable steps" taken by the employer
to prevent discrimination, either in the interest of fairness to the
employer 117 or to further effect legislative intent by providing em-
ployers with an incentive to implement anti-harassment policies
and grievance procedures.
118
B. Agency Principles vs. Legislative Intent
1. Scope of Employment
Since virtually the beginning of sexual harassment law, U.S.
and U.K. courts concerned themselves with the meaning of the
term "scope of employment. '"119 A major reason; no doubt, is
simply that the notion of employer liability for harm caused by an
115. Id.
116. The Burlington Industries Court noted, "Title VII is designed to encourage the
creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms." Id. Similarly,
the Burton Court stated that "an employer will be guilty of unlawful discrimination under
section 4(2)(c) [of the Race Relations Act] if he 'subjects' the employee to racial harass-
ment or racial abuse serious enough to amount to a detriment." Burton & Rhule [1997]
I.C.R. at 6.
117. The Faragher Court noted the importance of "giv[ing] credit.., to employers who
make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty." Faragher, 118 S.Ct. at 2292.
118. The Burlington Industries Court observed that recognizing "an employer's effort
to create [grievance] procedures .... would effect Congress's intention to promote con-
ciliation rather than litigation,... and the EEOC's policy of encouraging the development
of grievance procedures." Burlington Industries, 118 S.Ct. at 2270 (citations omitted).
Similarly, the Burton Court stated that a tribunal should consider:
[W]hether the [harassing] event in question was something which was suffi-
ciently under the control of the employer that he could, by the application of
good employment practice, have prevented the harassment or reduced the ex-
tent of it. If such is their finding, then the employer has subjected the employee
to the harassment.
Burton & Rhule [1997] I.C.R. at 10. Left unanswered, however, was whether an employer
who had applied good employment practice might still be held liable if the harassment oc-
curred anyway.
119. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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employee seemed so clearly to invoke the tort law agency doctrine
of respondeat superior.120 But there were other reasons as well.
For U.S. courts, the very language of Title VII appeared to
import at least some portion of agency law when it defined as un-
lawful the discriminatory employment practice of an employer
"and any agent. 121  Indeed, the Meritor Court referred lower
courts to agency principles in their efforts to define employer li-
ability. 122 Similarly, the court in Gary v. Long123 stated explicitly
that Congress' purpose in using the words "and any agent" was to
incorporate respondeat superior liability.
124
As a result, from the earliest cases, U.S. courts struggled to
determine whether a harasser's conduct was furthering his em-
ployer's enterprise in some way and thus within the "scope of em-
ployment. 125 Broad interpretations of this term resulted in find-
ings of employer liability, while narrow interpretations resulted in
findings of no liability. Finally, in Burlington Industries and
Faragher, the Court attempted to lay this struggle to rest.
Looking again to agency law,126 the Burlington Industries
Court noted, "The concept of scope of employment has not always
been construed to require a motive to serve the employer."'
127
Nonetheless, according to the Court, "The general rule is that sex-
ual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of
employment.' 128 Thus, although the Court went on to find em-
ployers liable for hostile environment sexual harassment on the
basis of a different agency principle, 129 the Court clearly defined
120. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
121. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (1994).
122. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
123. 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
124. See id. at 1399.
125. In Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), for example,
the court found a harasser's conduct to be "nothing more than a personal proclivity, pecu-
liarity or mannerism" and therefore outside the scope of his employment. "Certainly no
employer policy is here involved," the court declared; "rather than the company being
benefited in any way by the conduct of [the harasser], it is obvious it can only by damaged
by the acts complained of." Id. at 163.
126. The Court stated, "We turn to principles of agency law, for the term 'employer' is
defined under Title VII to include 'agents.' In express terms, Congress has directed fed-
eral courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles." Burlington Industries, 118
S.Ct. at 2265 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 2267.
128. Id.
129. The Burlington Industries Court described an agency principle called the "aided
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hostile environment sexual harassment by a supervisor as outside
the scope of his employment.
The U.K. experience initially mirrored that of the United
States. In a 1986 case, 130 the court cited the governing statutory
provision's definition of liability of employers and their principals:
"Anything done by a person in the course of his employment shall
be treated for the purposes of this Act... as done by his employer
as well as by him, whether or not it was done with the employer's
knowledge or approval.' 131 As a result, early decisions often
turned on the finding of whether the harassing conduct was within
the scope (or course) of the harasser's employment. 132
By 1996, however, the English court had apparently tired of
defining "course of employment" in terms of common law agency
doctrine. As noted above, the Court of Appeal, in Jones v. Tower
Boot Co. Ltd.,133 overturned a lower tribunal's finding of no em-
ployer liability because the complained-of harassment had been
outside the harassing employees' course of employment. Specifi-
cally, the appellate court found no justification for reading the
term "course of employment" as "subject to the gloss imposed on
it in the common law context of vicarious liability."'1 34 Instead, the
court opined that "a statute is to be construed according to its leg-
islative purpose, with due regard to the result which it is the stated
or presumed intention of Parliament to achieve and the means
provided for achieving it."' 135
Thus, although the U.S. and U.K. courts appear to be con-
verging on a similar, relatively strict standard of employer liability
for harassment by supervisor, they part company when it comes to
the underlying rationale. U.S. courts, bound perhaps by the
in the agency standard." See id. at 2268. This standard is defined in section 219 of the
Second Restatement of Agency, which states in relevant part: "(2) A master is not subject
to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, un-
less: ... (d) the servant ... was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation." RESTATEMENT (2d) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1984).
130. De Souza v. The Automobile Association [1986] I.C.R. 514 (Eng.).
131. Race Relations Act 1976, ch. 74, pt. IV, § 32(1) (Eng.).
132. In Irving & Irving v. The Post Office [1987] I.R.L.R. 289 (Eng.), the conduct of a
postman who wrote ethnic slurs on mail addressed to his African-Jamaican neighbors was
found to be not within the course of his employment and thus not imputable to his em-
ployer. See id. at 290-91.
133. [1997] 2 All E.R. 406 (Eng.).
134. Id. at 414.
135. Id. at 413.
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Meritor Court's advisement to "look to agency principles" to de-
termine employer liability, 136 have attempted to base liability on
the very common law principles that the English courts have es-
chewed in favor of public policy and legislative intent.
137
Nonetheless, when strict interpretation of a favored agency
principle fails to mandate a finding of employer liability, U.S.
courts have proved creative in finding other, more obscure agency
principles to justify their findings. One such example is the
Court's use in Burlington Industries and Faragher of the "aided in
the agency relation standard. 1
38
The Burlington Industries Court first identified "a class of
cases where, beyond question, more than the mere existence of the
employment relation aids in commission of the harassment: when
a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against the sub-
ordinate."'139 Where there is no tangible job detriment, however,
the Court declined to issue a definitive ruling, noting that the
agency relation standard "is a developing feature of agency
law."1 40 Relying instead on the Meritor decision, which held that
136. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. Intriguingly, one recent commentator asserts:
The Faragher and Burlington [Industries] Courts failed to test the conceptual
and factual assumptions underlying the principle of enhanced stare decisis in
statutory interpretation, and consequently misconstrued the significance of the
Meritor decision and the 1991 amendments to Title VII.... The Court's mis-
application of the principle of enhanced statutory stare decisis in Faragher and
Burlington [Industries] demonstrates the need for establishing a limitation of
the principle: it should apply only to conclusive judicial statements that send a
clear signal to legislators.
Note, Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 313,318 (1998).
137. Indeed, the appellate court in Jones v. Tower Boot carefully noted that it was not
bound by the finding in another case, Irving & Irving v. The Post Office [1987] I.R.L.R.
289 (Eng.), that the harassing conduct of a postal employee was outside the course of his
employment. Observing that the Irving Court never referred to a governing statute, the
appellate court in Jones concluded that "Irving does not decide that 'course of employ-
ment' in [the Race Relations Act] incorporates the common-law concept of vicarious li-
ability and we are not accordingly bound so to hold." Jones v. Tower Boot Co. Ltd. [1997]
2 All E.R. 406,411 (Eng.).
138. See Burlington Industries, 118 S.Ct. at 2268; see also supra note 129 for the Re-
statement definition of the "aided in the agency relation" standard cited by the Burlington
Industries Court.
139. Burlington Industries, 118 S.Ct. at 2268. The Court further defines "tangible em-
ployment action" as constituting "a significant change in employment status, such as hir-
ing, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or
a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Id. The Court also observes that, in
most cases, tangible employment action "inflicts direct economic harm." Id. at 2269.
140. Id.
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agency principles "constrain[ed] the imposition of vicarious liabil-
ity,"141 the Court defined an affirmative defense that employers
could assert in the absence of direct economic harm.
142
In short, the Burlington Industries Court "split the baby."
Using agency principles to justify finding an employer liable for
harassment by a supervisor, the Court then retreated a bit and
used agency law to justify restricting employer liability-all the
while giving the impression that it knew where it wanted to go but
was required to use agency law to get there. Finally, the Court set-
tled on a standard of vicarious liability with an affirmative defense,
similar to the standard established by the English courts without
the use of agency law.
2. Tangible Employment Action
In its attempt to define a uniform standard of employer li-
ability,143 the Burlington Industries Court rejected use of the dis-
tinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment harass-
ment as a basis for determining whether to apply strict or
negligence-based liability, respectively. 144 Such a rule, said the
Court, "encouraged Title VII plaintiffs to state their claims as quid
pro quo claims, which in turn put expansive pressure on the defini-
tion." 14
5
Unfortunately, by defining a standard of vicarious liability
with an affirmative defense that can be asserted only in the ab-
sence of tangible employment action, 146 the Burlington Industries
and Faragher Courts have, arguably, simply shifted the focus of fu-
ture litigation. Where plaintiffs previously sought to characterize
their complaints as quid pro quo harassment, they will surely now
seek to define the harm they have suffered as "tangible employ-
141. Id. at 2270.
142. See infra text accompanying note 158.
143. Citing the Meritor Court's finding that Title VII was intended to evoke agency
principles, the Burlington Industries Court stated, "[W]e conclude a uniform and predict-
able standard must be established as a matter of federal law." Burlington Industries, 118
S.Ct. at 2265.
144. "The terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are helpful, perhaps, in
making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and those
where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility." Id. at
2264.
145. Id. at 2265.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 140-142.
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ment action." 147
In any event, it is instructive to consider how English case law
has handled the issue of job detriment. In the 1986 case of Strath-
clyde Regional Council v. Porcelli,148 the appellate court left un-
touched the lower court's definition of job-related detriment,
agreeing that "suspension, warning, [or] enforced transfer" 149 fell
within the meaning of the Sex Discrimination Act. In another
1986 case, however, the court found the Porcelli Court's definition
of job-related detriment too limited and observed instead, "If...
the discrimination was such that the putative reasonable employee
could justifiably complain about his or her working conditions or
environment, ' 150  that could constitute sufficient detriment
"whether or not the working conditions were so bad as to
amount to constructive dismissal. '151
Indeed, by 1996, it appeared well-settled in English case law
that job detriment required neither disciplinary employment ac-
tion by the employer nor direct economic harm to the plaintiff. In
Burton & Rhule, for example, the court of first instance stated it
had "no doubt"152 that two young black waitresses who endured
racial and sexual slurs from an unruly dinner audience had suf-
fered a detriment "within the meaning of the [governing stat-
ute]. ' 153 The appellate tribunal agreed and found the waitresses'
employer responsible. 154
Thus, just as it did with "course of employment," the English
court relied on a commonsense understanding of the term "job
detriment." Moreover, by not premising employer liability (or the
assertion of an affirmative defense) on whether "tangible em-
ployment action" exists, U.K. courts have avoided some of the
147. Indeed, two commentators have already noted, "[lit is rare, and about to become
rarer, that a court will be asked to decide a case that boasts absolutely no adverse em-
ployment action. Complaints will now sprout language like: denied overtime, denied
promotional opportunities, received no raise or bonus, etc." Robert D. Lipman & David
A. Robins, Court's Harassment Rulings Provide Ammunition for Both Sides, N.Y.LJ., Oct.
1, 1998, at 1.
148. [1986] I.C.R. 564 (Scot.).
149. Porcelli v. Strathclyde Regional Council [1985] I.C.R. 177, 183 (Scot.).
150. De Souza v. The Automobile Association [19861 I.C.R. 514, 524 (Eng.).
151. Id.
152. Burton & Rhule v. De Vere Hotels [1997] I.C.R. 1, 5 (Eng.).
153. Id. at 5-6.
154. Seeid. at ll.
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more fact-intensive inquiries that plague U.S. courts.
3. Reasonable Steps and Avoidable Consequences
U.S. and U.K. law have apparently agreed on the use of such
negligence principles as reasonable steps and avoidable conse-
quences to soften what might otherwise be considered strict em-
ployer liability. Even so, recent decisions in both countries repre-
sent a shift away from, rather than toward, negligence-based
liability, at least for hostile environment harassment by a supervi-
sor.
Until Burlington Industries and Faragher, for example, most
U.S. courts required either actual or constructive knowledge be-
fore an employer could be held accountable for hostile environ-
ment harassment. 155 Indeed, some commentators have proposed a
notice liability standard for all types of sexual harassment.156 Not
surprisingly, the dissents of both the Burlington Industries and
Faragher decisions lamented the Court's move toward strict liabil-
ity. Justice Thomas wrote,
In such circumstances [in which a supervisor creates a hostile
work environment], an employer should be liable only if it has
been negligent. That is, liability should attach only if the em-
ployer either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known, about the hostile work environment and failed to
take remedial action.157
Nonetheless, although both decisions articulated a relatively
strict standard of liability, all was not lost. By allowing the em-
ployer to assert an affirmative defense under certain circum-
stances, the Court left the door ajar to the very negligence princi-
ples Justice Thomas decried losing. Specifically, the Court defined
an affirmative defense comprised of two necessary elements: "(a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
155. Michael J. Phillips has noted that "an actual-or-constructive-knowledge standard
predominates in this area," in spite of the fact that "Title VII makes employers strictly li-
able for discrimination by supervisors." Phillips, supra note 33, at 1240. Citing the 1982
decision Henson v. City of Dundee, Phillips further observes that the main justification for
this standard relies on agency law. Id.
156. See generally J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination
Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273 (1995); see also Dansky, supra note 67.
157. Burlington Industries, 118 S.Ct. at 2272-73 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise."
158
Note, however, that lack of knowledge is no longer relevant.
Moreover, the burden is now on the employer to show he acted
with reasonable care, rather than on the plaintiff employee to
show that the employer did not act with such care. Thus, the mes-
sage is now clear: the employer who wishes to protect his interests
will promulgate an anti-harassment policy with a well-defined set
of complaint procedures and communicate both to his employ-
ees.159
Interestingly, in creating a liability standard that includes the
possibility of an affirmative defense, the Court finally turned to
policy and statutory purpose. Noting first that the Meritor Court
intended agency law to limit the imposition of employer liabil-
ity,160 the Burlington Industries Court stated, "Title VII is designed
to encourage the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective
grievance mechanisms. '" 161 Thus, premising employer liability on
an employer's efforts to create such policies and procedures would
effect congressional intent.162
Moreover, according to the Court, the second element of the
defense also served congressional intent. Borrowed from another
area of tort law, the "avoidable consequences" doctrine allows a
defendant to assert an affirmative defense if the plaintiff has un-
reasonably failed to take saving action. 163 Thus, the Court ob-
served, "To the extent limiting employer liability could encourage
employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or
pervasive, it would also serve Title VII's deterrent purpose." 1
64
158. Id. at 2270.
159. Many commentators have noted the clear message to employers to implement
effective anti-harassment polices. See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, No, Bosses Aren't Always
Liable for Workplace Harassment, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1998, at 3/Z1; Marcia Heroux
Pounds, Small Firms Need Sex-Harass Policies, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 4, 1998, at E2.
160. See Burlington Industries, 118 S.Ct. at 2270.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 8, § 65 at 458. The authors define the doctrine of
"avoidable consequences," which "denies recovery for any damages which could have
been avoided by reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff." Id.
164. Burlington Industries, 118 S.Ct. at 2270.
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Similarly, although U.K. courts often looked to whether the
employer knew, or reasonably should have known, of the alleged
harassment, they also considered whether the employer took rea-
sonable steps to prevent the harassment from occurring in the first
place. In a 1987 case,165 for example, the court observed that
management had acted promptly to conduct an inquiry in response
to allegations of harassment, that supervision was proper and ade-
quate, and that the employers had "made known their policy of
equal opportunities.' 166 Thus, the court concluded, "it [is] difficult
to see what steps in practical terms the employers could reasona-
bly have taken to prevent that which had occurred from occur-
ring."' 67
Unlike U.S. courts, however, English courts have not had to
struggle to define the contours of an affirmative defense to a sex-
ual harassment complaint. Indeed, section 41(3) of the Sex Dis-
crimination Act establishes as a defense that the employer "took
such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the [harass-
ing] employee from doing [the complained-of] act."' 168 Thus, from
its earliest decisions, U.K. sexual harassment law has, at least with
regard to affirmative defenses, relied on statutory language and
legislative purpose rather than on interpreting and applying com-
mon law tort principles.
No doubt Parliament had such tort principles as "reasonable
steps" and "saving action" in mind when it drafted the affirmative
defense provisions of the Sex Discrimination and Race Relations
Acts. 169 Nonetheless, the benefit of having a codified defense
cannot be overestimated: U.K. case law on this issue has been
clear and coherent from the beginning.
Indeed, in a 1998 case, 170 the court concluded that the appel-
lant-employer had not made out the statutory defense under sec-
165. See Balgobin & Another v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1987]
I.C.R. 829 (Eng.).
166. Id. at 832.
167. Id. at 833-34.
168. Sex Discrimination Act 1975, ch. 65, pt. IV, § 41(3) (Eng.).
169. In language virtually identical to section 41(3) of Sex Discrimination Act, the
statutory defense section of the Race Relations Act states: "[It shall be a defence for [the
employer] to prove that he took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the
[harassing] employee from doing [the complained-of] act." Race Relations Act 1976, ch.
74, pt. IV, § 32(3) (Eng.).
170. See Chessington World of Adventures Ltd. v. Reed [1998] I.C.R. 97 (Eng.).
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tion 41(3) of the Sex Discrimination Act. It was clear, the court
said, that the employers were "aware of the campaign of harass-
ment directed towards the [employee], but [they] took no ade-
quate steps to prevent it."' 171 In a curious note, however, the court
added that the harassing situation "was plainly something over
which [the employers] could exercise control. ' '172
This last observation is apparently an attempt to reconcile the
finding of strict liability in Burton & Rhule173 with the statutory
defense of section 41(3). It remains to be seen what the English
courts will do with the Burton decision. But, if the language of the
Chessington Court is any indication, the question of whether the
employer has control over the situation in which the harassment
occurred may become simply a gloss on the statutory defense.
IV. PROPOSED: A POLICY-BASED APPROACH TO SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW
In summary, U.S. and U.K. sexual harassment law have ar-
rived at similar standards of employer liability for sexual harass-
ment by a supervisor. Essentially, the standard is one of strict or
vicarious liability, but with the possibility of an affirmative defense
if the employer can show he took reasonable steps to prevent the
harassment from occurring. In both countries, this defense is
available only if the harassment did not result in a tangible job det-
riment.
In the United Kingdom, this defense is defined by statute:
section 41(3) of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975174 for sexual
harassment claims, and section 32(3) of the Racial Relations Act
of 1986175 for racial harassment claims. By contrast, the United
171. Id. at 105.
172. Id.
173. [1997] I.C.R. 1 (Eng.). The Burton Court based its finding of liability on the fact
that the employer "permit[ted] the racial harassment to occur in circumstances in which he
can control whether it happens or not." Id. at 10. The Court decreed further: "[Al-
though] we can see that on occasions what the employer knew or foresaw might be rele-
vant to what control the employer could exercise ... foresight of the events or the lack of
it cannot be determinative of whether the events were under the employer's control." Id.
Strikingly, the Burton Court did not mention or cite to the available statutory defense, al-
though it did note the allegation by plaintiff's counsel that the employer took no steps to
prevent the harassment that occurred. See id. at 7.
174. Sex Discrimination Act 1975, ch. 65 (Eng.).
175. Race Relations Act 1976, ch. 74 (Eng.).
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States has only recently, in Burlington Industries and Faragher, de-
fined an affirmative defense to an otherwise strict liability stan-
dard.176 Furthermore, both the Burlington Industries and Faragher
Courts have declared that, where there is "tangible employment
action," there is no defense. 177
But however the standard is defined, whether by statute or by
case law, strict liability with an affirmative defense may well prove
to be an effective standard. As noted by a number of commenta-
tors, 178 both the strict liability standard and the "reasonable steps"
affirmative defense provide incentive to employers to implement
effective anti-harassment policies with well-defined grievance
mechanisms. In addition, the second element of the defense, re-
quiring unreasonable failure by the plaintiff-employee to take
saving action to avoid the harm, should encourage employees to
make use of those grievance mechanisms.
Moreover, as the Court itself noted, the resulting incentives
and rewards serve the Title VII goals of deterring sexual harass-
ment through the development and use of anti-harassment policies
and grievance procedures, and of promoting conciliation rather
than litigation as a means of solving those problems that do
arise. 179 Thus, as also noted by commentators, the Court has
"stepped into a policy-making role ... recogniz[ing] that employ-
ers are in the best position to prevent . . . sexual harassment and,
therefore, should have the burden of ensuring that supervisory
staff do not abuse the power entrusted to them. ' 180
This policy-making role is not unlike the role of the U.K.
courts in the development and application of their own sexual har-
assment law. Yet, consider for a moment some of the contortions
176. Note, however, that the notion of placing the burden of proof on the defendant to
show that, in effect, he was not derelict in his duty of reasonable care is not without prece-
dent in cases of intentional discrimination. See, for example, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-03 (1973), for a description of the "order and allocation of proof
in a private, non-class [employment discrimination] action" under Title VII. Id. at 800.
177. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998).
178. See, e.g., Debra S. Katz & Lynne Bernabei, Sex Harassment Cases Create Uncer-
tainties, TEX. LAW., July 20, 1998, at 28. "In Burlington and Faragher, the Court created a
standard of liability to provide a significant disincentive to employers who refuse to put
into operation appropriate procedures to prevent and correct sexual harassment and who
attempt to escape liability by claiming that they were unaware of the objectionable con-
duct." Id.
179. See Burlington Industries, 118 S.Ct. at 2270.
180. Katz & Bernabei, supra note 178.
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and convolutions so apparent in U.S. decisions as courts struggle
to effect Title VII goals even while fitting their rulings to agency
law.18
1
In Burlington Industries, for example, the Court observed, "In
express terms, Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Ti-
tle VII based on agency principles." 182 Pages later, after much dis-
cussion of agency law as well as the underlying purpose of Title
VII, the Court returned to Meritor and declared, "[W]e are bound
by our holding in Meritor .... Congress has not altered Meritor's
rule even though it has made significant amendments to Title VII
in the interim." 183 Similar observations and declarations punctu-
ate the Faragher Court's discussion of agency law and Title VII's
underlying purpose. 184
It is no doubt foolhardy to speculate on what the Court meant
by all this invocation of Meritor and signals from Congress re-
garding the application of agency principles. But it seems possible
that the Court, in both the Burlington Industries and Faragher de-
cisions, has issued a plea to Congress to free it from those very
principles. 185 Let Congress decide how, and to what extent,
181. Consider also the fact that one result of attempting to fit Title VII goals to nine-
teenth century tort principles is case law that does not always make sense. For example,
while U.K. statutes define the same standard of liability, and the same affirmative defense
for sexual and racial harassment, see supra notes 174-175; U.S. law has diverged for these
two causes of action. As Justice Thomas observed in his Burlington Industries dissent,
"[E]mployer liability under Title VII is [now] judged by different standards depending on
whether a sexually or racially hostile work environment is alleged. The standard of em-
ployer liability should be the same in both instances." Burlington Industries, 118 S.Ct. at
2271 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2265.
183. Id. at 2270.
184. The Faragher Court declared:
Meritor's statement of the law is the foundation on which we build today. Nei-
ther party before us has urged us to depart from our customary adherence to
stare decisis in statutory interpretation .... And the force of precedent here is
enhanced by Congress's amendment of liability provisions of Title VII since
the Meritor decision, without providing any modification of our holding.
Faragher, 118 S.Ct. at 2286 (citations omitted).
185. Intriguingly, at least one U.S. Supreme Court observer has noted the Court's re-
cent
[retreat] from the political landscape. As it increasingly evades disputes des-
perately in need of resolution, the [Court has become remote, content to let
conflicts play out without definitive resolution.... Gone is a vision of the Su-
preme Court as a guardian of civil rights and liberties, ready to play a leading
role in resolving heated social conflicts.
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agency doctrine can serve Title VII goals-and then codify the re-
sult. Let the courts then apply that law, ensuring as they do that
they have given effect to what ideally is a clear statement of con-
gressional intent.
Lynn Evans*
David M. O'Brien, Justice in Absentia, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at M1. In Burlington
Industries and Faragher, it seems evident that the Court did in fact attempt to resolve the
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stein's thoughtful argument for what he calls "judicial minimalism." CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
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cording to Professor Sunstein:
[L]eaving 'fundamental issues undecided' in cases dealing with questions 'on
which the nation is currently in moral flux'-his major examples are the right
to die, affirmative action, discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation,
and regulation of communication technologies like the Internet-the [Su-
preme] Court is promoting this country's 'highest aspirations without pre-
empting democratic processes.'
Lincoln Caplan, They Don't Want to Get Involved, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., May 30, 1999,
at 18. Thus, "by avoiding engagement with broad questions and applying a case-by-case
approach, the Justices encourage elected officials to deliberate on contentious matters and
to test their answers before the voters." Id.
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